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DOCTRINE OF PRECATORY TRUSTS.
:, 4 of the" Statute of Frauds, as
icted in Pennsylvania, was con-
aed, and it was held that the
isideration of a written agree-
.nt to answer for the debt of
ther need not be expressed in
e writing but might be proved
other evidence.
The doctrine of Wain v. Warl-
rs has been adopted in Colorado,
alaware, Georgia, Kansas, Mary-
ad, Minnesota, Montana, New
ampshire, New York and Wis-
consin. On the other hand, it is
provided by statute in Illinois, In-
diana, Kentucky, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Nebraska,
New Jersey and Virginia that the
consideration need not be stated.
And that it need not be set forth is
also law in Arkansas, Connecticut,
Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio,
Tennessee and Vermont.
H. BOVEE SCHERMURHORN.
DEPARTMENT OF WILLS, EXECUTORS,
ADMINISTRATORS.
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF.
HON. WILLIAM N. ASHMAN,
Assisted by
HOWARD W. PAGE, MAURICE G. BELKNAP.
BOYLE v. BoYLE.' SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Precatory Words.
A will containing the provisions "I give and bequeath to my 16ving
-wife Roda all my property real and personal for her support during her
natural lifetime ;. any remainder at her decease to be disposed of by her
as she may think just and right among my children," gives the widow a
fee, with all its incidents, including the power to sell and the power to
devise. The words referring to "any remainder" are precatory and do
not limit the. estate. Words of trust and confidence, without more, do
not create a trust or turn a devisee into a trustee. The intentions of the
testator to create a trust must be apparent apart from the mere existence
of words of trust and confidence, or none will be held to exist.
DOCTRINE op PRZCATORY TRusTs.
The doctrine of precatory trusts
has been traced to the Roman law,
where such words as peto, rogo,
volo, mando, fidei tuae, committo,
were generally used in the fidei-
commissum: Jus. Inst.'2, 24, 3:
Pennocks' Estate, 20 Pa., 268. The
earfier rule of English chancery
was that when by will property was
giyen absolutely to a person who
1152 Pa., ioS.
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was by the giver "recommended,"
"entreated," "requested" or
"wished" to dispose of that
property in favor of another, the
recommendation or. request was
-held to be imperative and to
create a trust, if the subject and
objects were certain: Powell on
Devises, 351 ; 2 Redfield on Wills,
- 419 Hill on Trustees, ii3.
It was formerly said that a prima
* fade presumption of an intention
to create a trust arose from the use
of precatory words; or, as put by
* Lord A&vAvry, "Whenever any
.persqn gives property and points
out the object, the property and
the way it shall go, that does
* create a trust, unless he shows
learly that his desire expressed is
to be controlled by the party, and
that he shall have an option to
defeat it:" Malim v. Keighley, 2
Ves. Jr., 333; Paul v. Comptom, 8
Ves., 375 ; Ford v. Fowler, 3 Beav.,
146; Prevost v. Clark, 2 Mad., 458;
Massey v. Sherman, Amb., 520;
Harding v. Glynn, 2 L. Ca. Eq.,
948 and note; Theobald on Wills,
355., At the same time there has
- alwdys existed a steady opposition
to the doctrine, on the part of
eminent jurists: Sale v. Moore, i
Sim., 534; Meredith v. Heneage,
id., 542; Lawless v. Shaw, i LI. &
C., 154; 5 Cl. & F., 129. The
criticisms of the text writers being
particularly severe for the reason
that to put such an artificial con-
struction upon the words of a will
* is to defeat the intention of the
testator in nearly every instance.
It can scarcely be presumed,"
writes Justice STORY, "that every
testator should not clearly under-
.stand the difference between such
expressions and words of positive
direction and command, and that
in using one and omitting the
other he should not have a deter-
minate end in view:" 2 Story's
Equity Jurisp., 1069; 2 Redfield
on Wills, 423; 2 Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisp., 1017.
Courts of equity have, for many
-years shown a strong tendency to
restrict the operation of the rile
within narrow bounds, so that the
doctrine of the early cases is now
practically obsolete. The change
has been effected through two
canons of cotistruction: first, that
the intention of the testator must
be ascertained by a consideration
of the whole instrument; second,
that when, a devise or bequest is
explicitly conveyed in a will it
cannot be defeated or abridged by
subsequent words which are am-
biguous: Reid v. Atkinson, Ir.
Rep., 5 Eq., 373; Sudgen on Prop-
erty, 276. In Iambe v. Eames,
JAMis, L. J., said: "In hearing
case after case cited I could not
help feeling that the officious kind-
ness of the Court of Chancery in
interposing trusts where, in many
cases the father of the family never
meant to create trusts, must have
been a very cruel kindness indeed:"
L. R., 6 Ch. App., 596. This de-
claration marks the change in the
current of decisions in England
with regard to precatory trusts:
Stead v. Mellor, s Ch. Div., 225;
In re Hutchinson and Tenant, 8
Ch. Div., 540. In the leading Eng-
lish case, It re Adams and the
Kensington Vestry, a testator gave
all his property to the absolute use
of his wife and her heirs "in full
confidence that she would do what
was right as to the disposal thereof
between his children either in her
lifetime or by will." The widow
took an absolute interest, COTTON,
L. J., saying, "We must not extend
the old cases in any way or rely
872•
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upon the mere use of particular
words, but, considering all the
words which are used, we have to
see what is their true effect and
what was the intention of the tes-
tator as expressed in his will :" 27
Ch. Div., 394; Mussoorie Bank v.
Raynor, 7 App. Ca., 327; In re
Diggles, 39 Ch. Div., 253. The
court will not allow a precatory
trust to be raised unless, on the
consideration of all the words em-
ployed, it comes to the conclusion
that it is the intention of the tes-
tator to preate a trust: Bretts'
Modern L. Ca., Eq., X3.
The rule requiring a definite sub-
ject matter and a definite object
applies as well to precatory as to
other express trusts: Knight v.
Knight, 3 Beav, 148; Williams v.
Williams, i Sine., N. S., 358. The
rule is not often applied, however,
to the extent of letting in the heir
or next of kin: Jarman on Wills,
366. Uncertainty in the object, it
is thought, furnishes a strong argu-
ment that the testator had no in-
tention to raise a trust: Bernard v.
Minshull, Johns, 276; Parnall v.
Parnall, 9 lCh. Div., 96; Howard v.
Carusi, 109 U. S., 725; cf. Atkin-
son v. Atkinson, 62 L. T. Rep., 735.
On the other'hand, if it plainly
appears that the testator believed
he was raising a trust by the use of'
words of recommendation or re-
quest, his iitention must *prevail,
and on failure for uncertainty the
heir or next of kin will be let in.
Once establish that a trust was in-
tended and the legatee can not
take beneficially: Briggs v. Penny,
-3 McN. & G., 546; In re Foley's
Will, io N. Y. S., I2; citing Wil-
lets v. Willets, 1o3 N. Y., 650;
Ingram v. Fraley, 29 Ga., 553. Just
as uncertainty of the property and
object are reasons for not constru-
ing the will as erecting a trust, so,
also, thefactthata trustwould cause
embarassment and difficulty, is a
reason for coming to the same con-
clusion: BowEN, L. J., in In re
Diggles, sutra. "It is not an un-
wholesome rule that if a testator
really mean his recommendation
to be imperative he should express
his intention in a mandatory
form:" Sugden on Property, 276.
In the United States there was at
first a manifest disposition to apply
the earlier English rule: Bull v.
Bull, 8 Conn., 47, Coates, Appeal, 2
Pa., 129; Cole v. Littlefield, 35 Me.,
439; Harrison v. Harrison, 2 Gratt.;
Lucas v. Lockhart, io Sm. and
Marsh., 466; Dresser v. Dresser, 46
Me., 58; Erickson v. Willard, i N.
H., 217; Hunter v. Stemridge, 12
Geo., 192.
In Florida, Alabama and South
Carolina the courts from the first
were inclined to. receive the rule -
with great caution, influenced by
the views of Judge SToRY and the
change which they perceived was
taking place in England : Lines v.
Darden, 5 Fla., 51;. Lesesne v. Witte, ,
5 S. C., 450. "We refuse," said'-
the Court in Alabama, "to follow
a rule of construction which many
acknowledge to have been founded
in error, and from which they
would gladly recede if they could:"
Ellis v. Ellis, i5 Ala., 296, c.f. Mc-
Ree's Exrs. v. Means, 34 Ala., 349.
The Court in Connecticut, it may be
added, took an early opportunity
of reconsidering their former dicta
and adopted a more restricted rule:
Gilbert v. Chapin, i9 Conn, 351;
Harper v. Phelps, 21 Conn., 257.
In the main the courts have kept
pace with the change of view in
England, and the doctrines adopted
in the two countries are substan-
tially the same.
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In Pennsylvania the doctrine of
precatory trusts has not met with
favor. Coates' Appeal (supra),
which upheld such trusts, was
formally reversed, the Court de-
claring that "the old Roman
hud English rfile on this subject
* was not part of the Common
Law of Pennsylvania:" Pennock's
Ebtate, 20 Pa., 268. A review
6f the principal cases that have
sustained and extended the ruliig
in Pennock's Estate will be found
in the opinion of WILIAMS, J.,
in Boyle v. Boyle, the case an-
notated: Burt v. Herron, 66 Pa.,
400; Janretche v. Proctor, 48 Pa.;
466; Church v. Disbrow, 52 Pa,
219; all leading to the conclusion
that the. intention of the testator
must be apparent apar from the
'mere existence of words of confi-
"dende or no trust will be held to
exist. In Bolby v. Thunder, testa-
" tor devised all his property to his
wife "in the fullest confidence . . .
that she will carry my intentions,
as to the ultimate distribution, into
effect." It was held that having
made an unqualified devise of his
property, no precatory words ad-
dressed to the devisee could defeat
the estate previously devised: io5
Pa., 173; ,Hopkins v. Glunt, iii
Pa., 287. In Good v. Fichthorn,
where the words were "I do hereby
enjoin and direct," it was said that
words of command were as ineffect-
'ual as precatory words to reduce an
estate in fee to an estate for life.
-,In Oyster v. Knull, however, where
testator devised a farm in the fol-
lowing words: "To my son N. for
his support and if he shquld be
spared to have a family I desire the
above estate to go to the use'of his
children," it was held that the
word "desire" was not precatory
but mandatory, and that thae son
took an estate for life. 137 Pa.,
448. Where the words of recom-
mendation or request are used in
direct reference to the estate they
are frima fade testamentary and
imperative, and not precatory:
'Board of Missions v. Culp, 151 Pa.,
467; ee Wood v. Camden Trust Co.,
44 . J. Eq., 419.
In addition to Pennsylvania, the
latest decision in a number of
States show a tendency to restrict
the operation of the doctrine within
narrow limits. In California a tes-
tator devised real property "recom-
mending" the devisee to leave his
portion, after his death, to his
children, and if none survived then
to Harvard College. The gift, it
was decided, was absolute to the
devisee. If the testator had in-
tended to create a trust he would
have said so in plain language,
such as he used in other clauses of
the same will. In re Whitcomb,
86 Cal., 265. South Carolina has
fortified the ruling in Lesesne v.
Witte, suntra, by decisions that lay
down the principle that "precatory
trusts or recommeiidatory words
imply discretion, and must be so
construed unless a different sense
is irresistibly forced upon them by
the context:" Rowland v. Row-
land, 29 S. C., 54; Howze v. Barber,
29 S. C., 466.
The Court of Chancery of Dela-
ware, in construing the following
clause: "I do request my wife, if
she should not require the whole
of my estate as a support, that she
will will at her death the remainder
to the children of my brother C."
held, that no trust arose in favor of
the children; the Chancellor noting
the fact that this was the first time
that the question had been raised
in Delaware: Bryan v. Milby, 24
AtI. Rep., 333. A similar result
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was attained in Nevada: Hunt V.
Hunt, ii Nev., 442; and Iowa: Bul-
fer v. Willingrod, 7r Ia., 620; Bills
v. Bills, So Iowa (where the words
might have been regarded as testa-
mentary since they referred di-
rectly to the property).
In Indiana, the reluctance of
.English chancellors to follow the
early decisions has been discussed
and the doctrine that an absolute
gift is not to be limited by subse-
quent precatory words considered
and approved: Fullenweider v.
Watson, IT3 Ind., 18; Van Gorden
v. Smith, 99 Ind., 4o4; cf. Elliott v.
Elliott, 117 Ind., 38o. So too in
Missouri the Court, referring to Ix
re Adams, siepra, has refused to
carry out the declared wishes of
the testator unless he has mani-
fested a clear intention to create a
trust: Corby v. Corby, 85 Mo., 371.
But the surrounding circumstances
of the parties must be taken into
consideration together with the
language of the will: Noe v. Kern,
93 Mo., 367 (a case where unusual
hardship would have resulted from
a failure on the part of the court to
raise a trust).
In Illinois the courts have shown
an inclination to favor precatory
words, raising a trust from the fol-
lowing clause in a will: "Reposing
implicit confidence in the goodness
and kindness of my dear wife, I
rely upon her to make all needful
provisions for my brother."
Blanchard v. Chapman, 22 11. App.,
34r. But in Giles v. Anslow, where
the words were "I have full confi-
dence in my beloved-wife M., that
she will do what is best and proper
with my effects," and. declaring
that she was to be free from all re-
straint, it was held that the widow
took a fee. "If the intention of
the testator be doubtful precatory
words will not be construed into a
declaration of trust:" i28 Ill., 187 ;
Mills v. Newberry, 112 Ill., 123;
Jones v. Jones, X24 Ill. 254. In
Randall v. Randall, 135 Ill., 398, it
was said that no trust can be im-
plied from words that merely indi-
cate the motive which induced the,
gift, and this is particularly the
case when the donee is the parent:
Seamonds v. Hodge, i5 S. E. Rep.
(W. Va.), 156. Where testator gave
all his property to his wife P for the
purpose of raising her children,"
it was held that no precatory trust
was created or implied thereby for
the children: Wilmoth v. Wilmoth,
34 W. Va., 426; Rhett v. Mason, i8
Gratt 541, cf. Young v. Young, 68
N. C., 309.
Ip Kentucky, a testator devised
and bequeathed property to his
brother, requesting him to settle
$io,ooo upon L., and added:" These
requests are not to be legally bind-
ing, but I desire to leave the same
to his discretion,-and to make no
requirement of him that would be
legally binding upon him in a court
of equity or elsewhere." The Cpurt,
nevertheless, taking all the facts
into consideration, decided that a
trust was created in favor of L.:
B'ohon v. Barrett, 79 Ky, 378.
Later decisions have distinguished
this case: Sale v. Thornberry, 86
Ky., 266; Enders v. Tasco, 89 Ky.,
1 7 . -
A decision that may produce a
reaction in favor of precatory trusts
is that in Colton v. Colton; by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
The testator, after a gift of all his
estate to his wife, continued: "I
recommend to her the care and pro-
tection of my mother Vnd sister,
and request her to make such gift
and provision for them as in her
judgment will be best." It was
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suggested that the subject matter
of the trust was so indefinite-as to
raise the inference that no trust
was intended. The Court, however,
decided that the subject matter was
sufficiently definite, and, as the
widow had declined to exercise her
discretion, it *ould be the duty of
" the court to determine what pro-
vision would be suitable, under the
circumstances: 127 U. S., 300. In
the opinion two Massachusetts de-
cisions are quoted with approval.
In Warner v. Bates, the most im-
portant of these, testatrix gave the
income from her estate to her hus-
band, "in full confidence" that
he would .give her children such
protection and support as they
might need. The Court, in hold-
" ing that the words raised a trust,
pointed out the merits of the doc-
trine of precatory trusts, and vig-
6rously defended the rule, but held
that the recommendatory clause
" must be so expressed as to warrant
the inference that it was designed
to be peremptory on the donee: 98
Mass. 274.
- In Hess v. Singler, 114 Mass.,
56, the testator, after a gift to his
son, signified his desire. and hope
that he would, by will or otherwise,
provide for certain relatives. The
* creation of a trust, the Court
thought, would have been incon-
sistent with the purposes of the tes-
tator.' In none of the Massachu-
setts cases has the court shown any
inclination to force the doctrine,
making it a matter of fair construc-
tion: Sears v. Cunningham, 122
Mass., 538; Barrett v. Marsh, 126
Mass., 213; Bacon v. Ransom, 139
Mass., 1i 7 ; Fiske v. Joy, 141 Mass.,
3p9. The words, "My said wife is
fully acquainted with my reasons
for this disposal of my estate, and
will, by her own last testament, do
whatis right and just to my children
and their natural heirs," did not
create a trust, but stated the motive
of the testator in not doing so:
Sturgis v. Paine, 146 Mass., 354.
Van Duyne v. Van Duyue, 14
-N. J. Eq., was the first important
discussion of the question in the
Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
The Chancellor. criticised adversely
the doctrine of precatory trusts, and
declined to raise a trust under the
will in question. His decision,
however, was, on appeal, reversed
by the Court of Errors and Appeals-
(15 N. J. Eq., 5o3), and,. although
no opinion was filed, the reversal
has always been regarded by the
bar and bench as an expression of
preference on the part of the court
for the older English law: Cpx v.
Wills, 49 N.J. Eq., 130, 573. In
Eddy v. Hartshorne, a legacy " to
A., with the request that upon his
death he leave the same to B. and
C.," was held to raise a trust in
favor of B. and C., not defeated by
the death of A. in testator's life-
time: 34 N. J. Eq., 49.
Where a testator gave property
to his wife "to dispose of as she
will elect," and added, "I would
however recomand her to increase.
the donation to B1." so as to make
her share equal to that left to C., a
trust was created in favor of B.
The Ordinary, although convinced
that the current of the later cases
in this country and in England is
against the adoption of this rule,
nevertheless felt bound to regard
it as binding upon him : Eberhart
v. Perolin, 48 N. J. Eq., 592.
The New York reports contain a
number of interesting discussions
of this question. In Foose v. Whit-
more a disposition was shown to
restrict the rule in conformity with
Lambe v. Eames (supra), 83 N. Y.,
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405. So, also, in Lawrence v.
Cooke, where, after a gift to the
wife, testator added: "I enjoin
upon her to make such provision
for said B out of my estate in such
manner, at such times and in such
amounts as she may judge to be
conducive to the welfare of B," the
Court decided that it was beyond
the power of any court to substitute
its discretion for that of the legatee,
and no trust was created. On the
other hand, in Phillips v. Phillips,
112 N. Y., 197, where the will, after
a gift to the wife, provided: "If
she find it always convenient to
give my brother the interest on
$ro,oco, I wish it to be done," a
charge was imposed in favor of the
brother. The provision contem-
plated, not the wife's discretion,
but her pecuniary condition each
year: Riker v. Leo, 115 N. Y., 93;
Rose v. Hatch, 125 N. Y,, 427.
The one important and vital in-
quiry-is, whether the alleged be-
quest is so definite as to amount
and subject matter as to be capa-
ble of execution by the court, or
whether it so depends upon the dis-
cretion of the general devisee as to
be incapable of execution without
superceding that discretion: Phil-
lips v. Phillips (sup ra).
The case of In re Ingersoll is
important, from its relation, to the
law imposing restrictions on char-
itable bequests. Testatrix, after a
gift, "relied" upon the legatee to
carry out certain charitable pur-
poses set forth in the will. The
Court held that the legatee took
the sum individually and absolutely
to be used in his discretion for the
general objects mentioned: 59Hun.,
571; compare Zn re Foley's Will, 1o
N. Y. S., 12. More important still
is In re Keleman's Will. Testatrix,
by her will, gave legacies to four
charitable institutions. Four days
later she added a codicil, as fol-
lows: "Doubts having arisen as to
the validity of the bequests made
for charitable purposes in my will,
I hereby modify my will by making
W my residuary legatee, and here-
by request him to carry into effect
my wishes with respect thereto, but
this is not to be construed into an
absolute direction on my part, but
merely my desire." This codicil
was added to prevent the failure of
the legacies, should testatrix die (as
in fact happened)within two months
of the execution of the will. The.
Court held the bequest to W abso-,
lute, and, therefore, on the face of
the will, valid.
In Wisconsin, the Court, while
disinclined to go to the length of
the older cases in establishing trusts
upon the strength of precatory
words, is not disposed to repudiate
the whole doctrine of such trusts:,
Knox v. Knox, 59 Wis., 172; and a
similar view prevails in Texas: Mc-
Murry v. Stanley, 69 Tex.,*227; see
also, Low v. Low, 77 Me., 171 ; and'
Cockerill v. Armstrong, 31 Ark.,
58o. In Ohio it was said in a re-.
cent case that while the decisions
may have been influenced by the
sympathy of individual chancellors
they generally agree that the inten-
tions of the testator, gathered from
the will in all -its terms, will be
given efect whether the terms be
dispositive, peremptory, or preca-
tory only: Ide v. Clirk, 5 Ohio C.
C., 239.
By way of summary it may be
said that the courts of this country,
as well as of England, exhibit the
same general tendency to limit,
rather than extend, the doctrine of
precatory trusts, and to construe
words of recommendation or desire
according to their natural and ordi-
